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Asset Fire Sales and Purchases and the International
Transmission of Financial Shocks
Abstract
We provide new evidence on the channels through which nancial shocks are transmitted across
international borders. Employing monthly data from 1996 to 2008 on over 1,000 developed country-
domiciled mutual and hedge funds, we show that inows and outows experienced by these funds
translate into signicant changes in their portfolio allocations in 25 emerging markets. Despite
fundse¤orts to ameliorate the price impact of these portfolio allocation shifts, they substantially
impact emerging market equity returns and are associated with increases in co-movement between
emerging and developed markets.
1. Introduction
How do asset returns across countries move together, and what drives changes in their co-movement
over time? These questions come up naturally when tracing the transmission of crises across mar-
kets, or when evaluating the benets of international portfolio diversication (a few recent papers
on the subject include Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994), King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994), Lon-
gin and Solnik (1995), Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) and Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2008)).
Theoretically, changes in return co-movement should be driven by changes in fundamentals, such
as trade between countries or common variation in macroeconomic variables, and this source has
been identied to have important e¤ects (see, for example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996),
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Rigobon (1998) and Glick and
Rose (1999)). However, there are situations in which the movement of fundamentals does not fully
explain co-movement between markets, and others in which co-movement is attributed solely to
non-fundamental sources (the latter is commonly referred to as contagion,especially as it relates
to emerging markets; see Forbes and Rigobon (2001) and Karolyi (2003) for useful surveys).
Recent theories explaining non-fundamental or excess co-movement have highlighted the im-
portant role of nancial intermediaries in transmitting shocks across borders. For example, Calvo
(2005) presents a model in which informed, but leveraged investment managers (Wall Street) are
responsible for elevated correlations between asset returns in di¤erent countries. More recently,
Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) present a model in which portfolio constraints amplify price uctua-
tions as well as cross-market co-movement.1 Yet, despite the strong theoretical backing for the role
of nancial intermediaries in the transmission of nancial shocks across borders, empirical evidence
on this channel has been suggestive, but not conclusive. The existing evidence has been inferred
indirectly by contrasting the behavior of investable and non-investable indices during crises (see
Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006)), cleverly extrapolated from the behavior of a small sample of
Latin American-focused investment managers (see Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004)), or tied
to cross-market banking lending activity (Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)).2
1In other work, Kodres and Pritsker (2002) present a model that generates co-movement through cross-market
rebalancing. Also, Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Yuan (2005) show that wealth-constrained investors who lose money
may need to liquidate positions in multiple countries, thereby spreading a crisis from one country to others.
2Also see Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and Forbes (2004).
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This paper provides signicant, new evidence in support of the theoretically predicted role
of nancial intermediaries in transmitting shocks across borders. To conduct the analysis, we
employ a large dataset on the monthly capital ows to, and country-allocations of, international
investment managers that invest in emerging markets, obtained from Emerging Portfolio Fund
Research (EPFR). The data span the period from 1996 to the present, and cover over a thousand
developed-country-domiciled funds which collectively hold on average 7% (and at maximum, 17%)
of the oat-adjusted market capitalization of the twenty-ve emerging markets in our sample.3 We
nd that when these funds experience shocks to their funding, they take actions that signicantly
impact emerging market equity returns, and change the patterns of co-movement between developed
market and emerging market returns. This evidence contributes to the growing literature linking
asset-market liquidity with the funding of nancial intermediaries. For example, Coval and Sta¤ord
(2007), show that U.S. mutual funds redeem investments as a consequence of funding shocks that
originate from their investor base, and when such redemptions are correlated across institutions
that hold particular stocks, the prices of these stocks fall signicantly. Acharya, Schaefer and
Zhang (2007) study the Ford and GM credit ratings downgrades in 2005, and identify that the
liquidity risk faced by brokers and dealers during that time translated into elevated co-movement
between the CDS spreads of GM and Ford, and those of rms in unrelated industries. Theoretical
papers in this emerging tradition include Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), and Adrian and Shin (2009).
Our starting point is to investigate the trading behavior of those global funds that are under
nancial pressure on account of signicant subscriptions or redemptions of capital by their investors.
Regardless of the cash bu¤er that they hold, these funds substantially alter their portfolio alloca-
tions in response to funding shocks from their investor base. These changes are economically and
statistically signicant: Global funds in the bottom decile (which experience signicant outows)
reduce or eliminate their holdings in approximately 80% of the markets in which they invest over the
month following the outows. This can be compared to the funds in the top decile, which experience
signicant inows, and reduce or eliminate just 21% of their positions. Similarly funds in the top
3Hau and Rey (2008a, 2008b), using alternative semi-annual data, highlight the importance of an examination of
the micro-level activities of individual funds by demonstrating the macro-level implications of their collective actions.
While the focus in their work is quite di¤erent, we follow this line of thinking using the monthly EPFR ow and
allocations data to explore the role that global funds play in international asset return co-movement.
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decile expand their holdings in 79% of the markets in which they invest, while those experiencing
signicant outows expand just 22% of their positions. However, the funds do seem to exercise
some discretion in the face of pressure from their outside investors: We nd that forced expansions
(reductions) of positions occur in relatively more liquid markets in the face of inows (outows).
Our next step is to connect these re-sale changes in global funds portfolio allocations to
emerging market stock returns. To do so, we construct a measure of emerging market capital that
is At-Risk. Specically, we rst take the product of the dollars allocated by each fund to each
emerging market with the ows experienced by the fund. We then aggregate the measure across
all funds in the sample to obtain total dollars At-Risk,and then normalize the measure in various
ways. The measure captures the amount of capital that a particular emerging market could see
enter or exit as a result of the inows and outows faced by invested funds. When we sort emerging
countries into quintiles each calendar month on the basis of At-Risk, we nd that the countries in
the top quintile of At-Risk outperform those in the bottom quintile by 128 basis points per month on
average, or 15.4% on an annualized basis. When we construct a calendar time portfolio that is long
the top quintile of At-Risk countries and short the bottom quintile of At-Risk countries, the alpha
of the portfolio is virtually unchanged when evaluated using either the excess return on the MSCI
G-7 index, or the excess return on the MSCI World index as the systematic risk factor. This large
and signicant di¤erence between the negative and positive At-Risk country-months suggests that
the re-sale changes in allocations by intermediaries subject to funding pressure have signicant
impacts on the prices of the markets in which the forced trading occurs.4
We then nd that these re-sale actions of global funds increase the co-movement between the
returns of the emerging stock markets most subject to this source of pressure and the returns
of the developed markets from which the funding shocks emanate. When we allow for betas on
the calendar-time portfolio to vary conditional on the sign of the G-7 excess return, the alpha is
eliminated. In the face of positive (negative) G-7 returns, emerging markets with positive (negative)
At-Risk capital have signicantly larger G-7 (and world market) betas than do countries with
negative (positive) At-Risk capital. Our explanation for this is as follows: When stock returns in
4It is worth noting here that the At-Risk measure includes contemporaneous information on capital inows.
Consequently, while these results tell us about price determination in emerging markets, they do not provide an
implementable trading strategy.
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developed markets are low, fundsinvestors have incentives to trim their investments in emerging
market for at least two reasons. First, they may face margin calls on developed-market asset
positions that result in the liquidation of foreign investments, including those undertaken through
global funds (see Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006)). Second, the denominator e¤ect(the need for
institutional investors such as pension funds to revert to pre-set target asset allocation percentages),
causes cuts in emerging market investments as developed market equity holdings shrink in value.5
These forces cause greater outows from emerging-market funds at times of low developed market
returns, increasing the pressure for forced liquidations by global funds, and generating greater co-
movement of stock returns between developed markets and the emerging markets that are negatively
At-Risk. The reverse mechanism applies when developed market stock returns are positive. The
organizational structure of global funds engenders periods of signicant trading pressure that provide
the conduit through which shocks can be transmitted and amplied across the many countries in
which these funds invest.
We then check whether the actions of the global funds in our sample stem from fundamental
or non-fundamental sources. One interpretation of our ndings is that the investors in these funds
are well-informed about the future fundamentals of the markets in which the funds are invested,
and decrease or increase the supply of capital to funds in response to their private signals about
these fundamentals. This would mean that our results identify that global funds are a conduit
for information transmission between developed market investors and emerging market returns.
Another, more resonant with the literature on contagion, is that the shocks to funding experienced
by global funds are purely liquidity shocks, and the consequent reductions or increases in global
fundspositions generate price pressure (and hence impacts on returns) in the emerging markets
in our sample. These should reverse when liquidity returns to these markets. We nd that both
interpretations nd support in the data: During periods of crisis in developed markets, it appears
that price pressure arising from the actions of global funds and their investors is the key driver
of emerging market returns. These return movements subsequently reverse. Outside of developed-
market crisis periods, we nd that information transmission seems to be the main source of emerging
market returns arising from the mechanism we identify, as there is less detectable reversal in returns
during such relatively calm periods.
5See Where the denominator e¤ect lurks,Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2008.
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To rene our understanding about the mechanics underlying these return patterns, we conduct
several additional tests. First, we implement our tests on a calendar-time portfolio constructed
using a variant of At-Risk that takes as an input predicted ( rather than realized) ows. We con-
tinue to nd a signicant asymmetry in the betas of this calendar-time portfolio, although the
alpha of the portfolio is no longer signicant. While this does not directly imply that there are
protable opportunities for front-running the re sales of global funds, this nding tells us that the
co-movement of international asset returns has an important predictable component, and that a
portfolio diversication strategy that takes advantage of re-sale information could help to reduce
risk ex-ante. Second, to make sure that we are picking up true crisis periods in the developed
markets, we also estimate a regime-switching model in which we allow the mean and variance of the
world market return to vary across regimes. When we re-estimate the calendar-time portfolio be-
tas, allowing them to di¤er across the estimated regimes, our results remain unchanged. Third, we
investigate the relationship between the liquidity of the underlying markets and the consequences
of re sales. We nd that the most illiquid emerging markets experience the largest return e¤ects
from being At-Risk, as we might expect. Finally, we control for emerging market return momentum
in our tests, as momentum trading by emerging market investment managers has been noted by
Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004). Our results are una¤ected by the use of this control.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in the study.
Section 3 relates the variation in the capital ows experienced by global funds to their investment
behavior. Section 4 connects the forced reallocations of global funds with underlying emerging
market stock returns, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
We employ two main sources of data: Global mutual fund and hedge fund data from Emerging
Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR), and country index return, market capitalization, and trading
volume data from Standard and Poors Emerging Markets Database (EMDB) and the World Banks
World Development Indicators Database. Over the period from February 1996 to October 2008,6
the EPFR data covers 1,520 live and dead globally-focused funds, domiciled in the US and Europe,
6With the exception of January 2000, for which data is missing for all funds.
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that invest in equity and bond markets in over 90 developed and emerging markets around the
world. For each fund and each month, EPFR collect the total net asset value (TNA) of the fund,
the return of the fund, the inow or outow from the fund, and the percentage of the funds assets
that are allocated to each country.7
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, we screen the EPFR fund data in a few standard
ways. First, given our focus on fund ows and stock returns in emerging markets, we keep only the
funds that invest in at least one emerging country (under the current MSCI classication) during
the sample period.8 Second, to avoid data errors, we only include funds once their TNAs hit the
US$ 5 million threshold. Third, in the early part of the sample, we nd that several funds have a
series of zero returns that persist for a few months. During these months, changes in TNA are all
lumped into fund ows by construction which clearly generates data errors, so we exclude them.
Fourth, since our analysis requires a signicant cross-section of funds, we restrict our sample to
those countries in which EPFR has data on at least 30 invested funds. Collectively, these exclusions
have almost no impact on our analysis as the excluded funds have negligible dollar holdings and
ows compared to the rest of the sample, but they reduce the number of unique funds in our sample
to a total of 1,097. Finally, we winsorize fund ows and returns at the -50% and +200% points
in order to minimize the inuence of potential outliers. This procedure a¤ects less than 1% of the
sample.
To investigate the reliability of the EPFR data, we compare the TNAs and monthly returns of
a subsample of funds to those in the CRSP mutual fund data. We match the two data sets by fund
name, using a scoring system that measures the proportion of common letters in the fund names,
and pick funds with a score of 70% or greater on this metric.9 We then carefully screen out incorrect
matches by hand. This process yields 126 funds that appear in both data sets (over 10% of the
sample) for comparison purposes. Figure 1 plots the TNAs and monthly returns from EPFR and
CRSP mutual fund data sets against one another, and shows that they line up very well. Almost
all observations lie on the 45-degree line. In the few cases where we have discrepancies, one of the
7Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) and Hau and Rey (2008a, 2008b) employ data on mutual fund holdings from
Thomson Financial Securities. These data provide detail on security level holdings, but are limited to semi-annual
observations.
8We exclude Zimbabwe from the list due to its extremely high ination.
9We thank Joey Engleberg for this name-matching program.
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two datasets does not capture all the available share classes (which then subsequently come on line,
occasionally with a several month lag). This yields minor di¤erences in TNA, despite returns being
roughly equal.
Table I reports the descriptive statistics of the EPFR sample by country. The average number of
funds investing in each country is as small as 32 for Jordan, and as large as 646 for Hong Kong. The
funds hold a signicant proportion of country market capitalization (3.02% on average across the
emerging countries), and the percentage holding varies less over time than across countries, ranging
from 0.11 percent in Jordan to 9.22 percent in Hungary. These holdings percentages are computed
using country index market capitalization; however Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(2003) show that rms in emerging markets are controlled by large shareholders, so only a fraction
of the shares issued in these countries are freely traded by minority portfolio investors such as the
foreign domiciled funds considered in this paper. Therefore, we provide an alternative representation
of the importance of these funds by scaling these percentages using the oat-adjustment factors
reported in Table 1 of Dahlquist et al. This raises the average holding of the funds in our sample
to 6.82% of oat-adjusted market capitalization.10
To broadly examine whether funds chase returns and whether fund behavior impacts stock
prices, we also calculate the time-series correlations between the active change in dollar holdings,
measured as a percentage of the countrys market capitalization, and country index returns. The
average contemporaneous correlation is 7%, statistically signicant at the 5% level. In nineteen of
the twenty ve sample countries, this correlation is positive. The average correlation between the
active change in holdings and the lagged country index return is also 7%, and statistically signicant.
This suggests that funds tend to increase holdings in the countries that recently experience high
returns, similar to the ndings in Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004). Finally, the average
correlation between the lagged active change in holdings and the country index return is 4%, and
again statistically signicant. This positive correlation, along with the positive contemporaneous
correlation, suggests that fundstrading may impact prices both immediately and with some lag.
As we are interested in the behavior of both the ows to funds (i.e., the behavior of the investors
in the funds) as well as the behavior of the funds themselves, we conduct a preliminary investigation
with the purpose of identifying the location of the ownership base of the funds. The rst step in
10Two of the countries in our sample (Colombia and Russia) are not covered in their paper.
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this process is presented in the gures in Appendix 1, which document the location of domicile
of the funds in the sample. The gures show that the funds are primarily domiciled in developed
market jurisdictions: at the end of 1997, for example, 85% of the funds are domiciled in Ireland,
Luxembourg, the U.K. or the U.S., with the lions share (63%) in the U.S. By the end of 2007,
the fraction for these four domiciles is unchanged, remaining at 85%, but with some of the share
of funds moving from the U.S. (46%) o¤shore to Luxembourg (27%). The substantial fraction of
funds in the data domiciled in the developed markets, and especially onshore in the U.K. and the
U.S. suggests that the investor base of the funds in the sample is predominately located in the
developed markets. Second, we compare the data at the country level to data on the net foreign
transactions of U.S. investors reported in the Treasury International Capital System (TIC) (see
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). We rst compute the active changes in dollar holdings
across all EPFR funds in each country as the aggregate dollar holding of the EPFR funds at the
end of the month in the country less the dollar holding at the end of the previous month multiplied
by the gross country index return (i.e., the expected dollar holding if all funds follow the buy
and hold strategy). We then standardize the active change in dollar holdings by dividing it by the
end-of-prior-month country index market capitalization, and cumulate this percentage from the
beginning of the sample period in each country, to get an idea of the evolution of EPFR fund
ownership in the country. We follow essentially the same procedure with the TIC data, cumulating
and standardizing the net transactions of U.S. investors, and plot the EPFR series against the TIC
series. (For the purposes of visual inspection, we subtract means and divide by standard deviations
to plot the two series on the same scale.) Figure 2 shows the results of this exercise for Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Mexico, and Russia. The EPFR and TIC cumulative ownership changes move together
closely for all four countries: on a month-to-month non-cumulative basis, the cross-country average
correlations between the EPFR and TIC ownership change series are 20% for emerging countries.11
These pictures appear to verify the conjecture arising from the fundsreported domiciles that a
signicant fraction of the investor base is located in the U.S. (comparable statistics to TIC are not
available for Europe).
11Note that the standardization for plotting purposes masks the fact that the TIC ows for Hong Kong are much
bigger in magnitude than the active changes in dollar holdings from the EPFR data. For Russia, however, the opposite
holds. These di¤erences can be attributed to the inclusion of European-domiciled funds in the EPFR data, and the
potentially far broader coverage of US investors in the TIC data.
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In Table II, we investigate the characteristics of the sample funds. TNA varies dramatically
across funds (and is highly positively skewed), with the (pooled) average equal to US$ 610.93 million
and the (pooled) standard deviation equal to US$ 2.2 billion. The sample contains both funds which
invest exclusively in one country and those which invest in a broad set of countries. On average,
the sample funds hold 3.44 percent of their TNAs in cash, broadly in line with the statistics on
the mostly U.S. sample reported by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007). The cash holdings dont change
much over time, although at the extremes, funds may increase or decrease cash by as much as 12
percent of their TNAs. Consistent with the highly variable emerging market returns, fund returns
vary signicantly both in the time series and in the cross section (the mean monthly return is 0.71%
and the pooled standard deviation is 8.41%). Alphas, measured as an intercept from the time series
regression of fund returns on the MSCI world index returns, average 48 basis points per month.
The average alpha decreases by more than half under the Fama-French four-factor model, to 21
basis points per month. Most of the decrease is driven by the momentum factor, echoing Carhart
(1997). As for fund ows, measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA, the mean
and median are close to zero. The 1st and 99th percentiles of ows are -24.28 percent and 31.70
percent, respectively, indicating that ows are highly variable. This variation is useful in identifying
funds and countries that are likely to experience nancial pressure. It should also be noted that the
EPFR sample includes index funds. Indeed, by 2008, about 50% of the funds in our sample are
index funds, identiable by the relatively low volatility of their percentage allocations to underlying
countries. For the purposes of our paper , uninformedindex fund demand is just as interesting
as the demand of actively managed mutual funds, in the sense that it adds to the literature on how
mechanical shifts in portfolio allocations a¤ect asset prices (see Shleifer (1986) and Wurgler and
Zhuravskaya (2002)), and consequently we leave these funds in the sample. It is worth noting here
that the results are very similar when we split the sample of funds into index and non-index funds
and repeat the analysis for each group separately.
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3. Fund ows and fund behavior
3.1. Flows and performance
Our goal is to understand how the funding of managed investment vehicles impacts their allocation
decisions, and consequently the stock returns of the markets in which they invest. A necessary
rst step in this exercise is to decompose the variation in funding into expected and unexpected
components. This decomposition will allow us to separately evaluate the distinct roles that are
played by shocks to funding versus movements in funding that can be anticipated. To e¤ect this
decomposition, we rely on the vast literature that documents a link between capital ows to managed
funds and their past performance (see, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Writing flowj;t for
the capital ows of a sample fund j in a month t and Rj;t for its return in the same month, our








We estimate the model in two ways, rst, as a pooled regression across all funds and time periods,
and second, using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973), where we estimate a cross-sectional
regression for each month in the sample and then calculate the time-series average of the coe¢ cients
and the t-statistics using the time-series standard error of the mean.
Table III presents the results from estimating (3.1). First, there is a statistically signicant
relation between future fund ows and both lagged ows and lagged returns. Specically, monthly
ows are signicantly predicted by lagged ows through the rst year. While lagged returns also
predict future ows, the e¤ect is less pronounced as it appears to be limited to the most recent
quarter. Second, the results are broadly comparable across both the pooled and Fama-MacBeth
regressions, but the reported R2 is naturally smaller in the former case as it reects both cross-
sectional and time-series variation in fund ows. These results are largely in line with previous
research insofar as they suggest signicant predictability in fund ows; however, we should point
out that the reportedR2, 27% in the Fama-MacBeth regression, is somewhat smaller than that which
is generally reported elsewhere. It seems the ow-performance relationship is less pronounced for
funds investing in emerging equity markets. Finally, given the tted values implied by the time-
12Note that we only estimate this specication for funds that ever invest in an emerging market over the sample
period.
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series average of the coe¢ cients from the estimated Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table III, we
measure expected fund ows for each fund at each point in time. We will report various features of
expected ows implied by this regression below.
3.2. Fund ows and re-allocations
Our next step is to discover the extent to which movements in fund ows impact fundsallocation
decisions and investment behavior. To the extent that fund inows and outows put pressure on
fund managers to re-allocate, sorting funds along this dimension may help highlight the particular
instances in which forced selling (or buying) is taking place.
As a start, we sort fund-month observations into deciles according to fund ows and document
the characteristics of the fund-months in each decile. Table IV provides average fund characteristics
across di¤erent groups of funds sorted by realized monthly ow, where reported statistics are the
means for each variable across all fund-months in each decile. The rst column of the table presents
a simple reiteration of the fact that the funds in our sample indeed experience signicant di¤erences
in realized ow, with the extreme deciles facing a range of 13.6% (top decile) to -12.6% (bottom)
monthly ows as a percentage of assets under management. While this spread is notable, it obtains
by construction since this is the exact dimension along which we are sorting. That said, a portion of
this di¤erence is associated with predictable expected ows, as constructed in the previous subsec-
tion. The second column of Table IV shows that the top and bottom deciles of realized-ow-sorted
funds were expected to experience ows of 0.9% and -1.7%, on average, respectively. (We later
revisit the e¤ects associated with realized and expected ows). The third column of the table shows
that funds experiencing the largest inows (outows) also experienced the highest (smallest) prior
investment returns, consistent with the evidence in the literature that fund ows are linked to past
performance. Finally, two additional observations about the fund characteristics are worth high-
lighting. The fourth column of Table IV shows that consistent with the ndings of Warther (1995)
and Coval and Sta¤ord (2007), funds in the top decile hold, on average, considerably more cash
than those in the bottom. As the sharp di¤erences in cash holdings could imply some variability in
a funds ability to manage investor ows, we will explore the link between ows, forced re-allocation,
and cash holdings in more detail below. Also, the fth column of Table IV shows that the funds
that appear in the extreme ow deciles have relatively fewer country holdings than the average
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fund; hence, extreme ows in either direction may induce relatively elevated market impact at the
country level if funds in those deciles indeed maintain their focused country allocations. Finally,
we describe the market capitalization and trading volume of the markets in which the funds are
investing. While there are no signicant di¤erences in these characteristics across ow deciles, the
funds in the EPFR sample are, on average, investing in slightly larger and more liquid markets than
the median market.
For fund ows to generate pressure on the equity markets in which the funds are invested,
the funds experiencing the ows must adjust their equity positions in response to the ow-exerted
pressure. To see whether this is the case, we sort fund-month observations into deciles according
to fund ows and calculate the average proportions of countries in which the funds in each decile
increase, decrease, or eliminate their holdings. Table V presents evidence on the degree to which
funds re-allocate their holdings in the face of signicant realized (Panel A) and expected (Panel B)
ows. We begin with an examination of the behavior of funds around periods of extreme realized
ows. The rst column of the table, concerning realized fund ows, is identical to the previous panel
to reinforce that this sort is identical to that presented above in Table IV. In the second through
fourth columns of Table V, we present a summary of the country allocations that funds in each
decile are, on average, expanding, reducing, or eliminating. Before proceeding, the manner in which
we measure position changes requires some explanation. As mentioned above, we observe the funds
USD allocation for each country in each month. For each fund-country-month, we compare the USD
allocation at the end of the month to the value that would be implied by grossing up the holding
using the relevant USD index return for the country given the beginning of month USD allocation.
If the actual value is greater (less) than this constructed buy-and-hold benchmark, we say the fund
has expanded (reduced) its position; if the USD value is zero, we say the position was eliminated.13
Funds in the bottom decile (signicant outows) reduce or eliminate around 80% of their positions
over the next month. Contrast this with funds in the top decile (experiencing signicant inows),
which reduce or eliminate just 21% of their positions over the next month. Similarly funds in the
13This di¤ers somewhat from the usual convention in the literature where share holdings are directly observed
(though at the quarterly frequency). The main di¤erence between the EPFR data and the 13-F lings data employed
by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and others is that the 13-F data contains the number of shares held by nancial
institutions, whereas EPFR records the value of the funds USD value allocation at the country level (though at the
monthly frequency).
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top decile (inows) expand 79% of their positions, while those experiencing signicant outows
expand just 22% of their positions. These di¤erences across ow deciles are highly statistically
signicant. The fth column of Table V demonstrates that the average magnitude of the change in
risky positions also exhibits di¤erences across realized fund ow deciles a movement from extreme
inows to extreme outows is on average associated with a 0.38% decrease in the allocation to the
average country in the portfolio. The nal column of the table highlights that cash balances also
expand (shrink) for funds that exhibit large inows (outows). In sum, it appears that global funds
do signicantly re-allocate their exposures in emerging markets in the face of investor redemptions
and subscriptions.
In unreported results, we also split the sample into index and active funds (based on the time-
series volatility of their percentage country allocations) to see if these trading patterns di¤er across
the two groups. For index funds, it is unsurprising if allocation changes follow inows and outows,
since these funds more or less mechanically allocate capital to underlying stocks with the objective
of minimizing tracking error relative to an index. It would be somewhat more surprising to see
forced trading behavior (especially in the face of inows) in actively managed funds since these
funds have some discretion to hold the ows in cash and wait for an opportune moment before
investing. Surprisingly, the two groups of funds (index and active) do not exhibit statistically
di¤erent re-allocation behavior. (As all of the subsequent results are virtually identical for the two
groups, we elect to simply report the full sample results).
In the next section, we will explore whether this forced re-allocation also a¤ects emerging market
returns, and provides a channel through which global market shocks are transmitted to emerging
markets. Before moving to this next step, we examine the extent to which re-allocation decisions
are linked to variation in expected ows, with the view that such predictability could allow global
funds to anticipate and hence manage their activities on the margin. However, if we were to observe
comparable variation in re-allocation patterns in the face of expected and realized fund ows, this
would suggest that funds face constraints inhibiting them from making adjustments to cushion the
e¤ect of movements in ows. Consequently, global funds could collectively act as a mechanism for
the transmission of nancial shocks across borders even if they can anticipate funding pressure.
Panel B of Table V presents the evidence for funds sorted into deciles according to expected fund
ows determined from the Fama-MacBeth regressions in equation (3.1). As with the sort based on
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realized ow above, the second to the fourth columns of the table reveal a sizeable divergence in
the behavior of funds. For instance, funds in the bottom decile of expected ow reduce or eliminate
about 61% of their positions over the next month, whereas funds in the top decile reduce or eliminate
only 41% of their positions. And again, funds in the top decile of expected ow expand around 59%
of their positions over the next month, contrasted with just 39% for those experiencing outows.
While these di¤erences are not as stark as those presented above across realized ow deciles, they
are still economically and statistically signicant, moreover the fth column of Table V Panel B
shows that the funds do indeed signicantly re-allocate the magnitudes of their risky positions.
Taken together, the behavior of funds that are expected to experience signicant ows is partially
predictable. The only notable exception is presented in the nal column of Table V Panel B, where
we show that funds do not experience signicant di¤erences in the change in cash balances across
expected ow deciles. This is in contrast to the sizeable di¤erence in cash changes related to (largely
unexpected) realized ow, and may be a reection of the degree to which funds can better manage
anticipated ows.
Figure 3 graphically represents the average net change in positions as a function of fund ows.
The net change in positions is measured as the proportion of countries in which the fund increases
its holdings minus those in which the fund reduces or eliminate its holdings. Panel A of the gure
visually represents the ndings in Table V, namely that realized and expected ow are associated
with similar reallocations, although the extremes of realized ow move allocations much more
than expected ow. Panel B of the gure investigates the role that the extent of the cash bu¤er
available to funds plays in their reallocation decisions; the deciles in this gure are computed across
fund-months of ows plus cash. The gure shows that accounting for fundscash bu¤er does not
signicantly alter the observed reallocation behavior, especially in the face of outows.
Table VI investigates whether funds lean against the tide of the funding pressure that they
face, by trading in relatively more liquid markets. The table employs quarterly transactions costs
data compiled by Elkins/McSherry (see Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001)), on average trading
costs as a percentage of trade value for 28 billion shares traded by over 700 active global investment
managers. The data is split into explicit costs, namely commissions and fees; and price impact
costs, which is the percentage di¤erence between the execution price and a benchmark for buys,
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and the reverse for sells.14 In Panel A, the weight for each country is determined by the estimated
amount of each country bought and sold. In Panel B, all countries carry equal weight. The former
could feasibly be contaminated by correlation between average transaction costs and the size of
the underlying market;15 this would mechanically deliver a lower average cost among large markets
in which funds trade heavily. To the extent that the evidence on transaction costs is comparable
across both the value and equal weighting of countries, we can be relatively condent that rms do
indeed attempt to trade strategically in the face of these pressures.
The table shows that, regardless of the weighting scheme, reallocations in the face of funding
pressure are concentrated in countries with lower transactions costs: For example, funds facing the
maximum outows reduce positions in country-months with total transactions costs that are on
average 5.54 basis points lower per trade than those facing inows, whereas funds in the top decile
of inows expand positions in country-months with total costs that are 5.17 basis point lower per
trade than those facing outows. These di¤erences are statistically signicant for both explicit and
price impact costs, and statistically signicant di¤erences are also evident for expansions versus
reductions for funds facing inow pressure, and the reverse for funds facing outow pressure. The
results clearly point to attempts by global funds to ameliorate the impacts of the funding pressure
that they face, by concentrating their re-sales in relatively more liquid markets. This nding
has surprising consequences for emerging market policy: Countries that develop relatively better
trading infrastructure might su¤er disproportionately from the impacts of re sales, since better
liquidity apparently attracts greater re-sale volume.16
4. Flow-induced pressure and equity prices in emerging markets
4.1. Capital At-Risk
In the previous section, we discovered that global funds experiencing inows (outows) are prone to
expanding (reducing or eliminating) their emerging market allocations. This naturally leads to the
conjecture that these re-sale reallocations impact prices, since signicant discounts are likely to
result from these demands for instant liquidity. Of course, the price pressure that forced reallocations
14This benchmark is computed as the mean of the days open, close, high and low prices.
15Say, for example if larger markets are more liquid.
16Thanks to Ajay Shah for this insight.
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are likely to generate in a given countrys stock market depends on (i) how much of the market is
held by the funds (since liquidating larger stakes will naturally result in larger discounts) and (ii)
the aggregate ows that these funds experience (which index the extent of forced redemptions or
purchases by the funds). Accordingly, we propose a new measure that reects the proportion of a
countrys market capitalization that is At-Riskof forced selling or buying. Specically, for country




flowj;t  allocationj;k;t 1  TNAj;t 1 (4.1)
where flowj;t = flowj;t + flowj;t 1 + flowj;t 2, is the sum of capital ows experienced by fund
j over the quarter prior to and including month t, and allocationj;k;t 1 is the percent of fund js
TNA invested in country k at the end of month t  1.17 In our empirical applications we normalize
USD At-Risk by either the market capitalization of the stock-market of country k at the end of the
previous year, or by the average monthly volume of the stock market over the prior calendar year.
To provide a concrete example of the construction of At-Risk, imagine a fund at the end of Jan-
uary 2008. Assume that the funds portfolio allocation to Korea measured at the end of December
2007 is 25%, and the funds TNA reported at the end of December 2007 is US$ 100 million. If the
funds total ow over the November-December-January quarter is 10%, this yields US$ 2.5 million
as the fund-country At-Risk dollars at the end of January 2008 (i.e., if ows were proportionally
allocated, this is how much they would additionally deploy into the country). (To clarify further,
suppose instead that the total ow over the November-December-January quarter was -20%: this
would yield US$ -5 million as the fund-country At-Risk dollars at the end of January 2008.) Put
simply, the At-Risk measure captures the quantum of capital that a particular emerging market
could see enter or exit as a result of the inows and outows faced by invested funds. Since both
fund allocations and TNAs are measured at the end of the previous month, the measure is uncon-
taminated by valuation changes over the same month in which we measure market returns. Thus,
the only source of contemporaneous variation in At-Risk is the ow experienced by funds invested
in the country.
17We use ows over the previous quarter in order to alleviate concerns about any potential measurement error as
well as to acknowledge that the funds may face increasing pressure based on ows experienced over several months.
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To ascertain the impact of being At-Riskon an emerging market, we compute At-Risk for each
of the countries each month, and then sort the country-months into quintiles. Table VII Panel A
shows summary information on the characteristics of the countries in each of these quintiles. The
top quintile captures those countries where invested funds experienced signicant inows over the
last quarter (including the most recent month). In contrast, the bottom quintile captures those
countries where invested funds experienced outows over the last quarter. The rst two columns
of the table present cross-sectional variation in the ratio of At-Risk capital divided by either local
market capitalization (the sort variable in this table) or monthly trading activity (volume). While
the At-Risk levels are quite small relative to total market capitalization, the levels are a signicant
portion of average monthly trading volume: For instance, At-Risk capital in quintiles 1 and 5
constitute 8.1% and 3.4% of average monthly trading volume (in absolute terms), respectively.
These signicant fractions of trading volume suggest that any forced trading induced by ow shocks
could have important e¤ect on prices, especially in light of the evidence that emerging markets are
plagued by illiquidity and high transaction costs (see Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and
Lundblad (2007)). The third column of Table VII Panel A shows that the countries in the extreme
quintiles (1 and 5) represent a signicantly larger share of the capital invested by the funds in our
sample than those in the intermediate quintiles. This is an important by-product of the construction
of the At-Risk measure: To have signicant capital At-Risk, the country of necessity will represent
a signicant fraction of global funds allocations. This automatically reduces concerns that the
extreme At-Risk countries are unusual in the sense that they impose investment restrictions, and
the attendant concern that any return patterns associated with being At-Risk are a product of such
restrictions. However it does raise the concern that any patterns we discover stem from elevated
allocations to these countries, especially in light of the extensive evidence on the informational
advantage enjoyed by international investors (see Seasholes (2000), Froot, OConnell and Seasholes
(2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2008)). Consequently, when we explore how being At-Risk relates
to emerging market price determination, we compare our measure with an alternative based solely
on fundsaggregate holdings unrelated to their capital inows and outows.
Finally, the fourth and fth columns of Table VII Panel A compare our measure of At-Risk
capital to a similar sort variable rst proposed by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007). This variable,
PRESSURE_2, is closely related to At-Risk, but di¤erent insofar as PRESSURE_2 measures
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fundsactual (rather than potential) trading activity in the face of signicant inows or outows
(i.e., it replaces allocationj;k;t 1 with jallocationj;k;tj in equation (4.1) above, counting only flowj;t
and allocationj;k;t that are in the same direction). To measure changes in fund allocations using
the EPFR data, we take the di¤erence between observed allocations and those that would result if
funds were following a buy-and-hold strategy. Indeed our results in Table V employ this method,
and we could easily use these measures of active changes to construct PRESSURE_2. While
the use of this method seems reasonable when the goal is to evaluate fund behavior in response
to movements in ows (as in Table V), when analyzing the impacts on underlying country prices
and returns, we wish to be more careful. Our approach is to avoid any possible contamination that
may result from sorting countries using a measure of active changes that employs contemporaneous
returns in its construction. Consequently, we prefer our At-Risk measure to PRESSURE_2, and
employ it in all our analyses of country returns.18 Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison, we forge
ahead and compute PRESSURE_2, again scaling the quantity either by trading volume or market
capitalization. The statistically signicant di¤erences in both versions of PRESSURE_2 (scaled
by volume in the fourth column and market capitalization in the fth column of Table VII Panel
A) across the At-Risk quintiles suggest that the same countries that face signicant At-Risk capital
face considerable PRESSURE_2. In other words, At-Risk captures the same re-sale mechanism
identied by Coval and Sta¤ord (2007). In the next section, we turn to an exploration of the pricing
implications of signicant At-Risk capital.
4.2. Capital At-Risk and price determination
4.2.1. Sorts
To investigate the impact of re-sale pressure on stock returns, we construct equally-weighted
calendar-time portfolios based on At-Risk capital. Each month, we sort countries into quintiles
according to At-Risk capital (as a percentage of the countrys market capitalization, exactly as in
Table VII Panel A) and calculate portfolio returns (in USD) by averaging returns across all countries
in the same quintile. We also compute the probability that any country will stay in the same quintile
18Given the di¤erence between the EPFR data and the 13-F lings mentioned above, we use capital At-Risk rather
than the PRESSURE measures preferred by Coval and Sta¤ord. The 13-F data contains the number of shares held,
whereas EPFR records the value of allocated capital; changes in the latter will be a¤ected by local market returns.
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portfolio over the next month in Panel B of Table VII. While countries do maintain their positions to
some degree, these are far from xed portfolios. The steady-state transition probability for countries
(computed by taking the transition matrix to a high power) is approximately 20% across each of
the ve portfolios, i.e., there is about an equal chance for the 25 emerging markets in our sample
to end up in any of the ve At-Risk portfolios. For comparison purposes, the persistence of stocks
in the usual size and book-to-market portfolios is considerably more pronounced.
Panel A of Table VIII reports the time-series mean and standard deviation of each At-Risk
quintile portfolio both for the entire sample period and conditional on the contemporaneously
realized world market excess return. In Table V we documented that global funds, on average,
re-allocate their investment positions in the face of sizeable subscriptions or redemptions. We also
showed in Table VII that collectively, the potential re-allocation implied by the amount of capital
At-Risk represents a non-trivial fraction of domestic market trading in these countries. Table VIII
shows that sorting countries on the size of the potential re-allocation results in a signicant spread in
stock returns. Equity markets that are likely associated with signicant fund purchases (quintile 1)
and sales (quintile 5) for a month earn, on average, 191 and 63 basis points per month, respectively.
The di¤erence, of 128 basis points per month, is highly statistically signicant, and implies an annual
return of 15.4% for the zero-investment portfolio created by going long the top quintile of At-Risk
countries and short the bottom quintile of At-Risk countries. Figure 4 shows the cumulative returns
on this long-short portfolio, also graphing the cumulative return on the world market portfolio in
excess of the risk free rate. Clearly, re-sale re-allocations seem to generate economically signicant
return movements in emerging markets. However, the gure does demonstrate that there are periods
when the long-short At-Risk portfolio underperforms (such as over the 2004-2005 period) suggesting
that there are risks embedded in these returns. The gure also shows that some of the largest returns
on the portfolio occur during periods of global crisis, which is perhaps unsurprising given that these
periods are likely to coincide with the most intense pressure on funds.
The other important nding in Table VIII is that the portfolio returns display a strong link to
the sign of the world market return. When the contemporaneous world market return is positive,
top quintile At-Risk countries outperform bottom quintile At-Risk countries by 133 basis points per
month. However, when the contemporaneous world market return is negative, countries that are in
the bottom quintile of At-Risk have far more negative returns (122 basis points per month lower)
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than countries which are primarily held by funds facing relatively lower outows. Our explanation
for this pattern is similar to the argument put forward in Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006): Given
that the world market return stems primarily from developed markets (it is a value-weighted index),
funding pressure from developed country investors on the developed country-domiciled funds in
our sample is likely more intense when developed countries have fallen on hard times, i.e., when
developed country stock markets are performing poorly, and vice-versa. When stock returns in
developed markets are low, investors in those markets face margin calls that result in the liquidation
of their foreign investments, including those undertaken through global funds. The denominator
e¤ectreferred to earlier will also have impacts on institutional allocations to emerging market funds.
This means that outows will be greater at such times of low developed market returns, resulting
in more pressure for forced liquidations or re-salesby global funds. As a result, the correlation of
stock returns between developed markets and the emerging markets held most by funds subject to
this source of pressure will increase. The reverse of this argument applies when developed market
stock returns are positive, generating higher return correlations between positive At-Risk countries
and developed markets. If so, the countries held most by funds that face the maximum (minimum)
pressure should be hit hardest (least) when developed stock markets are performing poorly. In
support of this conjecture, Figure 5 provides graphical evidence that ows into funds that invest
in emerging markets are highly correlated with developed equity market returns (the time-series
correlation between aggregated global fund ows and G-7 returns is 0.49).
To verify that developed market returns are indeed the source of this pressure, Table VIII
Panel B re-estimates the conditional relationship using the return on a portfolio of G-7 countries
in place of the world market return. Exactly the same pattern emerges again, suggesting that
our posited mechanism is indeed the one in operation (to conrm this, we subsequently explore
the implications of this disparity for world market and G-7 betas of a calendar time portfolio). A
note on identication is in order here: While it is true that we do not have explicit information
about the nationality of the investors that invest in the funds in our sample, our explanation of
the asymmetric conditional correlation relies on several important facts. First, the funds in our
sample are overwhelmingly domiciled either in the U.S. or in Europe, leading to the presumption
that their investor base is most likely from these economies. Second, we nd that the aggregated
EPFR ows track the U.S. Treasury-recorded net asset ows of U.S. investors quite well over time,
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as documented in the Data section. Third, the asymmetry in the correlations that we document
here and elsewhere in the paper are just as pronounced when we use the G-7 risk premium in place
of the world risk-premium, lending credence to our posited mechanism.
4.2.2. Calendar time portfolios
To understand the economic source of the return di¤erences, we examine the returns of a calendar-
time portfolio strategy formed by going long the highest At-Risk quintile portfolio and going short
the lowest At-Risk quintile portfolio. Given the exposures to the world market portfolio return
documented above, we focus on the world CAPM as a benchmark, employing the G-7 portfolio
return as an additional control. Specically, we regress our long-short portfolio returns on the
world market risk premium, and we also estimate a conditional version of the model in which we
allow the loading on the world market portfolio return to di¤er between periods in which the world-
market return is positive and negative. The rst two columns of Table IX report the regression
results. In the rst column, we report the alpha and beta associated with our long-short strategy
for the unconditional world CAPM. A portfolio that goes long countries facing signicant buying
pressure and short countries facing signicant selling pressure yields an alpha of 130 basis points
per month, which is almost the same magnitude as the return spread presented in Table VIII. The
world market beta of this long-short portfolio is e¤ectively zero: Investment re-allocation decisions
generated by shocks to global fundscapital ows have signicant implications for traded prices but
yield negligible exposures to global shocks. This last point requires further exploration given the
sizeable di¤erences in At-Risk quintile returns conditional on positive and negative global returns.
The second column of Table IX conrms our initial sort-based nding that there is a pronounced
asymmetry in the betas of the long-short portfolio: periods of positive and negative global market
returns exhibit signicantly di¤erent e¤ects on the returns of our long-short portfolio. In the face of
positive world market returns, countries with positive At-Risk capital have signicantly larger world
market betas than do countries with negative At-Risk capital. In sharp contrast, when world market
returns are negative, countries with negative At-Risk capital have signicantly larger world market
betas (in absolute terms) than do countries with positive At-Risk capital. Our explanation for this
is the same as that mentioned in the previous section, and again we re-estimate the specication
using the G-7 returns in place of the world market returns in Table IX Panel B. The results are
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virtually the same, suggesting that our proposed transmission mechanism applies.
Because our At-Risk portfolio sort involves contemporaneous fund ow information, the alpha
of 128 basis points per month in Table IX is not indicative of a tradeable strategy, rather it sim-
ply speaks to the e¤ects that unexpected forced buying or selling by global funds have on price
determination in emerging markets. That said, we also document above that global fund ows are
to some degree predictable, and funds appear to re-allocate even in the face of predicted ows.
To explore the price e¤ects of predicted ows (and thereby the implementability of the trading
strategy), we also sort countries according to predicted At-Risk, calculated by substituting the ex-
pected ow (E[flowj;t]) based on the model in (3.1) for flowj;t in (4.1). Comparable world CAPM
regression results are presented in the last two columns of Table IX. As can be seen, the alpha in
column III is no longer statistically signicant, so it appears that much of the price e¤ect in the rst
column of Table IX is associated with the more pronounced forced buying and selling generated
by unanticipated funding shocks. This echoes our nding in Table V Panel B that the observed
level of fund re-allocation in the face of expected ow variation is signicant but less pronounced.
However, in the fourth column of Table IX, the conditional version of the world CAPM does yield
signicant and similar evidence regarding the di¤erent conditional betas of the long-short portfolio
based on positive or negative world market (or G-7) returns. In other words, expected ow is useful
in predicting betas, and therefore potentially useful in an asset allocation context, although the
strategy of providing liquidity to markets based on expected ow is not likely to be protable.
Since At-Risk is a product of both the fundscollective holding in the country as well as the ows
the funds face, it is interesting to see whether it is really the pressure created by fund ows that
explains the patterns in Table IX, or simply the fact that global funds disproportionately allocate
capital to some of these markets. To address this question, we repeat the analysis in Table IX, with
one di¤erence: We sort countries into quintile portfolios based on the beginning-of-month holding
(as a percentage of the countrys market capitalization) alone. The results are presented in Table
X, where we do not observe a statistically signicant alpha for the long-short portfolio, or changing
conditional betas. The table does show that countries that are held in larger proportion by global
funds (quintile 1) appear to have higher betas than those in quintile 5 they disproportionately
gain or lose more when the contemporaneous world market excess return is positive or negative,
respectively. These results conrm that it is the combination of high holdings and pressure from fund
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inows and outows that generates the return patterns and changing conditional betas. Holdings
alone are not su¢ cient to infer these e¤ects.
4.2.3. Country returns and forced transactions in event time
We turn to an additional exploration of the price e¤ects of forced transactions, to separate to what
degree the detected price e¤ects arise from price pressure rather than from information transmission.
In the previous section, we attempt to control for information arrival by exploring the price e¤ects
associated with predicted At-Risk. As previously done by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Sta¤ord (2004)
and Coval and Sta¤ord (2007), we go further in this section by disentangling price pressure from
information e¤ects in the context of an event-time analysis. If forced fund trading reects the
information available to their outside investors, then we should observe an initial price reaction
followed by zero subsequent drift in abnormal returns. Alternatively, if fund trading is driven by
simply by uctuations in their investorsdesire for liquidity, then we should observe an initial price
reaction followed by a period of reversal in the abnormal returns.
Figure 6 displays monthly cumulative abnormal country returns (CARs) for countries in the
highest (Q1) and lowest (Q5) At-Risk quintiles. Countries are sorted into quintiles (in month 0)
on the basis of actual At-Risk using current-month fund ows. For each event, CARs are measured
as average monthly returns of all countries in the quintile in excess of the equal-weighted average
return of all emerging countries in the sample. CARs are then averaged across events. Panel A
presents the CARs during crisismonths, i.e., when MSCI G-7 returns are at or below their 10th
percentile (this corresponds to months in which G-7 returns are less than approximately  5%).
The pattern in average abnormal returns during periods in which funds are facing pressures and
developed markets are relatively distressed is notable. We document sizeable abnormal returns in
the months of presumed forced buying and selling, which subsequently drift in the same direction
for close to a year. Most importantly, the pattern in abnormal returns in part reverses once the
e¤ects of forced trading subside. This evidence is particularly pronouced for the Q5 portfolio,
suggesting that widespread forced selling by funds exerts signicant downward price pressure in
emerging markets when developed market prices are signicantly falling. Information e¤ects would
likely not explain the full reversal observed in this portfolio.
In contrast, Panel B repeats these same calculations but for countries in Q1 and Q5 quintiles
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during relatively more normalmonths in which the MSCI G-7 returns are larger than  5%. These
periods are not associated with extreme price depreciation in the developed markets in which these
funds are located. When there is signicant ow pressure in periods unrelated to developed market
crisis, the reversal in abnormal returns is largely absent in the Q1 portfolio, but still evident (though
to a lesser extent) in the Q5 portfolio. While there are signicant price e¤ects in emerging markets
over the relevant months as funds respond to pressure, the lack of complete reversals suggests that
fund pressure (and presumably the altered portfolio demands among their end investors) during
relatively more calm periods in the G-7 markets reect information transmission. To summarize,
the coupling of developed market distress with fund pressure appears to be particularly impor-
tant. These results are indicative of one possible dimension along which contagion e¤ects could be
separated from the cross-border transmission of fundamental information.
4.3. Additional tests and robustness
4.3.1. Regime switching model
We reconrm that our results on changing conditional betas are indeed driven by bad times
in developed markets by estimating a regime-switching model, in which both mean returns and
variances of return are allowed to vary across regimes. Details about the specication of the model
are in Appendix 2. Our estimates of the characteristics of the world market return and volatility
indicate that there are two regimes in the data, namely a high return and low volatility regime
(regime 1) and a low return and high volatility regime (regime 2). These two identied regimes
are consistent with the evidence documented in prior literature (see Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan
(2006), for example). Appendix Figure 2.2 shows that the probabilities of being in regime 2 are
high in periods of negative world market returns but the correlation is not perfect. Appendix
Table 2.1 shows that the world market beta of the long quintile 1-short quintile 5 At-Risk portfolio
is estimated to di¤er across the two regimes, and a Wald test of the null hypothesis that betas
are the same in both regimes rejects the null at the 3% level of signicance, indicating that beta
is indeed signicantly higher in regime 1 than in regime 2. Specically, in the high return and
low volatility regime, the high positive At-Risk capital portfolio has higher beta than the high
negative At-Risk capital portfolio. The opposite is true in the absolute value sense in the low return
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and high volatility regime. Collectively, the estimates from the regime-switching model echo our
earlier ndings, and support our proposed mechanism that global funds facing signicant outows
constitute an important transmission mechanism for shocks across borders.
4.3.2. Momentum and At-Risk
Given that a number of global funds are known to follow momentum-based strategies and that
anticipated fund ows are related to past fund (and hence country) performance, we explore the
degree to which our ndings are related to the momentum phenomenon. We construct a long-
short emerging market momentum portfolio by sorting the countries in our set by past country
index returns. In unreported results, we add this emerging market long-short momentum portfolio
to the right-hand side of our calendar time regressions to assess whether our At-Risk measure is
explained by momentum. The coe¢ cient on the momentum portfolio is not statistically signicant,
and the other results discussed above are nearly identical (these results are available on request).
The country momentum anomaly seems to be a separate issue from the price determination e¤ects
associated with the funding pressure of globally-focused funds.
4.3.3. Liquidity of the underlying market and At-risk price e¤ects
In Table VI we showed that in the face of pressure, global funds attempt to soften the blow by
expanding or reducing positions in relatively more liquid markets. We therefore investigate whether
the price e¤ects of being At-Risk also di¤er with the liquidity of the market. One possibility is that
since fundsre sale reallocations are concentrated in more liquid markets, greater price impacts will
be felt in such markets. Another is the more obvious possibility that funds are not able to completely
o¤set the e¤ects of pressure by moving to relatively more liquid markets, and that relatively more
illiquid underlying markets face greater price e¤ects from being At-Risk. In unreported results, we
nd that when countries are double sorted on At-Risk and transactions costs, that both the price
e¤ects and the change in conditional betas are concentrated in the relatively less liquid countries.19
To complement these ndings, we also consider an alternative construction of the At-Risk mea-
sure that directly incorporates transaction costs. We measure the product of At-Risk (as a percent-
19This analysis is available on request. Note that double-sorting means that the number of countries in each month
is signicantly reduced, with a consequent reduction in statistical power.
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age of market capitalization) for each country constructed as before and the price impact cost for
that country. Each month, we sort the countries into quintiles according to the resulting liquidity-
modied At-Risk measure. Consistent with the evidence presented above, Table XI shows that the
long-short portfolio based on At-Risk sorted in this fashion is associated with a larger average return
(1.7% per month). Also, the world market exposure asymmetry is largely unchanged. While Table
VI shows that funds do try to strategically trade in the face of fund ows, the fact that they do
sometimes have to trade in relatively illiquid markets manifests itself in a more pronounced return
during such periods.
5. Conclusion
We nd that the funding shocks experienced by a large set of developed country-domiciled global
investment funds result in forced portfolio reallocations by these funds in twenty ve emerging
markets around the world. These re sale reallocations have an important impact on the average
stock returns of the a¤ected emerging markets, which conditionally reverse depending on whether
the G-7 markets are currently experiencing signicant return declines. Perhaps more importantly,
we also nd that at times when emerging stock markets are predominately owned by global funds
most subject to these funding shocks, they also have signicantly elevated correlations with devel-
oped stock markets. We conclude that global investment managers, and the constraints they face,











Appendix Figure 1. Distribution of Countries of Domicile.  This figure plots the total net assets (TNA) 
shares for different countries of domicile of the funds in the EPFR sample at the ends of 1998, 2003, and 
2007.  The TNA share is calculated as the sum of TNAs of all funds that are domiciled in each country 
divided by the total TNA of all funds in the EPFR sample on each date.  Countries other than Cayman 
Island, Ireland, Luxembourg, the U.K., and the U.S. have very small shares, and as a result, are grouped 






Appendix Figure 1 – Continued 
  
Appendix 2
Conditional on being in state s, at time t the world market risk premium RW;t is assumed to be
normally distributed:
(RW;tjst = s)  N(s; 2s); (5.1)
where the unobserved state variable in our model, st, can take on one of the two values, st 2 f1; 2g.
Letting  t represent all available information through time t, the state variable st is assumed to
follow a two-state Markov process:
P (st = jj t 1) = P (st = jjst 1 = i) = pij (5.2)





2; p12; and p21. Once the regime-switching model has been estimated, we then estimate
the conditional market model for the long-short calendar time portfolio return as:
rL S;tjs = + sRW;t + "t (5.3)
where "  N(0; 2). This requires another 4 parameters to be estimated, namely ; 1; 2; and 2.
Our estimation of the total of 10 parameters therefore proceeds in two steps. First, we esti-
mate parameters in equations (5.2) and (5.1) by maximum likelihood, using only the world market
premium to identify regimes. We then use the rst-step parameter estimates and the posterior
regime probabilities to estimate parameters of (5.3). Appendix Table 2.1 reports the results, while
Appendix Figure 2.2 plots the estimated regime probabilities, along with the periods in which the




Appendix Table 2.1 
Regime-Switching Model Estimation 
 
This table reports parameter estimates of a regime switching model of calendar-time long-short portfolio 
returns.  The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  The frequency is monthly.  Each 
month, the portfolio is formed by going long an equally-weighted portfolio of countries in At-Risk 
quintile 1 and going short those in At-Risk quintile 5.  World market premium is measured as the return 
on MSCI world index minus the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.  Parameters are estimated by two-step 
maximum likelihood.  In the first step, parameters of the regime-switching model for the world risk 
premium are estimated.  The estimated regime probabilities are then used to estimate parameters of the 
regime-switching market model for the calendar-time portfolio returns.  Standard errors are calculated 
based on the outer product of the score of the likelihood function.  The Chi-squared statistic is based on 
the Wald test of the hypothesis that loadings on the world risk premium are the same across the two 
regimes.   
          




Mean World Risk Premium 
(Regime 1) 1.278***
(0.518) (0.301) 
Beta (Regime 1) 
0.453* 
 
Mean World Risk Premium 
(Regime 2) -1.200 
(0.243) (0.914) 
Beta (Regime 2) -0.151 Volatility (Regime 1) 2.559***
(0.136) (0.251) 
Volatility of Residual Returns 5.499 Volatility (Regime 2) 5.585***
(0.249) (0.790) 
Probability of Staying in Regime 1 0.954***
(0.032) 
Probability of Staying in Regime 2 0.945***
(0.041) 
Log likelihood 221 Log likelihood 276  
H0: Loadings on world risk premium are the same across regimes 
Chi-squared 4.693** 
p-value (0.030) 








Appendix Figure 2.2  Regime probabilities.  The graph plots the probabilities of the regime in which 
the realized world risk premium is volatile and low, for the period from March 1996 to October 2008.  
The regimes are estimated based on the mean and volatility of the world market premium, measured as 
return on MSCI world index minus one-month Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate.  
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Summary Statistics by Country 
This table provides descriptive information regarding the EPFR sample, summarized by the emerging 
country in which the funds invest.  The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  The 
number of funds is the total number of unique funds that invest in the country at any point in time during 
the sample period.  ‘Holding’ aggregates dollars held across all funds each month, and divides by the 
country’s latest year-end market capitalization; time-series means and standard deviations are reported.  
We also report the holding as a fraction of the float-adjusted market capitalization, rescaling market 
capitalization to adjust for the percentage not closely held as reported in Table 1 of Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2003). There are a few countries for which the float-adjustment is not available. 
For each country-month, active change in holding is the change in dollar holding net of the country index 
return in the month, divided by the country’s latest year-end market capitalization; time-series 
correlations are reported with the country index return.  Average correlations are calculated using the 




Holding (% of Market Capitalization) 
Correlation (Active Change 





(Float-Adjusted) (t,t) (t,t-1) (t-1,t) 
Argentina 248 2.55 2.54 5.39 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Brazil 352 4.00 1.29 12.18 0.15 -0.02 0.10 
Chile 253 1.95 0.73 5.57 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10 
China 614 1.40 1.02 4.48 -0.21 0.10 0.00 
Colombia 139 0.69 0.62 0.12 -0.06 0.08 
Czech Republic 246 3.88 2.23 17.73 0.24 -0.12 -0.04 
Hong Kong 646 2.30 0.85 4.02 0.16 0.02 0.02 
Hungary 275 9.22 3.69 18.25 0.09 0.08 0.12 
India 518 3.82 1.28 6.41 0.18 0.23 0.14 
Indonesia 461 3.77 1.56 12.17 -0.16 -0.17 0.15 
Israel 269 1.62 0.87 3.86 0.04 0.35 0.17 
Jordan 32 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.18 
Malaysia 450 1.83 0.93 3.82 0.25 0.22 0.06 
Mexico 315 5.83 1.62 7.90 0.21 0.08 0.02 
Morocco 55 0.38 0.25 0.75 0.11 0.09 -0.03 
Pakistan 118 1.18 1.27 5.23 -0.02 0.05 0.04 
Philippines 348 2.73 1.08 5.59 0.00 -0.01 0.07 
Poland 262 5.20 2.65 14.55 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Russia 358 3.92 1.32 0.03 0.16 -0.07 
South Africa 271 1.59 0.62 3.36 -0.01 0.13 -0.15 
South Korea 567 4.98 2.04 8.20 0.09 0.09 -0.06 
Taiwan 569 2.88 1.46 3.71 0.30 0.17 0.15 
Thailand 468 3.86 1.46 9.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 
Turkey 285 3.44 1.53 11.81 0.14 0.12 0.08 
Venezuela 151 2.35 2.34 6.11 0.02 0.10 -0.01 
Average 307 3.02 1.41 6.82 0.07 0.07 0.04 




Fund Summary Statistics 
This table provides descriptive information regarding the funds in the EPFR sample. Only funds that 
invest in emerging countries at any point during the sample period are included.  The sample period is 
from February 1996 to October 2008. The statistics are pooled across fund-months, except for the cross-
sectional statistics on alphas.  Total net assets (TNA) are the total asset value in U.S. dollar at the end of 
each month.  Number of countries invested is the total number of countries, including both developed and 
emerging countries, in which the fund has non-zero allocation.  Allocation to each country and cash 
holding are measured as a percentage of TNA.  Month-to-month change in cash holding, fund flows, and 
fund returns are measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA.  Alphas are measured as an 
intercept from the time-series regression of each fund returns on the MSCI world market returns for the 
World CAPM or on the world market returns, SMB, HML, and UMD for the Fama-French four-factor 
model.  Alphas are estimated only for funds that exist for at least 12 months. 







Total Net Assets (TNA: US$ million) 610.93 2,200.93 2.80 124.99 10,177.98 
Number of Countries Invested 9 8 1 7 31 
Allocation to Each Country (%) 30.39 34.63 2.85 12.39 103.74 
Cash Holding (%) 3.44 6.14 -9.50 2.39 24.10
Month-to-Month Change in Cash Holding (%) 0.05 4.70 -11.97 0.00 12.50 
Flow (%) -0.06 7.88 -24.28 -0.19 31.70 
Return (%) 0.71 8.41 -23.11 1.34 22.19 
Alpha (World CAPM, %) 0.48 1.06 -2.47 0.43 2.86 
Alpha (Fama-French Four-Factor, %) 0.21 1.02 -3.25 0.22 2.54 





Predictive Regressions for Fund Flows 
This table reports results from regressions of fund flows on log of beginning-of-month TNA, lagged fund 
flows and lagged fund returns.  The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  The 
frequency is monthly.  Both fund flows and fund returns are measured as a percentage of the beginning-
of-month TNA.  All variables in the regressions are divided by their own standard deviations.  Fama-
MacBeth regression coefficients are the time-series average of monthly cross-sectional regression 
coefficients, with t-statistics calculated as the time-series standard error of the mean.  The reported R-
squared is the average across all cross-sectional regressions.  The pooled regression results are based on 
OLS.  The number of observations is denoted by N, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
              
Pooled Fama-MacBeth 
Variable   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept -0.008 (-0.94) -0.129 (-4.31) 
ln(TNA) -0.002 (-11.16) -0.001 (-3.30) 
Flow_lag1 0.144 (28.22) 0.129 (7.07) 
Flow_lag2 0.088 (17.03) 0.076 (6.16) 
Flow_lag3 0.058 (11.31) 0.066 (8.16) 
Flow_lag4 0.036 (6.94) 0.042 (5.28) 
Flow_lag5 0.046 (8.99) 0.051 (6.11) 
Flow_lag6 0.031 (5.99) 0.027 (3.06) 
Flow_lag7 0.028 (5.32) 0.029 (3.31) 
Flow_lag8 0.029 (5.65) 0.033 (4.33) 
Flow_lag9 0.019 (3.79) 0.023 (2.48) 
Flow_lag10 0.022 (4.42) 0.025 (2.69) 
Flow_lag11 0.018 (3.65) 0.026 (3.02) 
Flow_lag12 0.028 (6.24) 0.025 (3.23) 
Return_lag1 0.098 (19.55) 0.166 (7.16) 
Return_lag2 0.042 (8.13) 0.081 (2.88) 
Return_lag3 0.022 (4.38) 0.024 (0.66) 
Return_lag4 -0.010 (-2.04) 0.065 (1.07) 
Return_lag5 0.014 (2.75) -0.088 (-1.36) 
Return_lag6 -0.001 (-0.20) 0.091 (0.92) 
Return_lag7 0.004 (0.82) -0.008 (-0.14) 
Return_lag8 -0.008 (-1.62) -0.020 (-0.54) 
Return_lag9 0.003 (0.54) 0.007 (0.27) 
Return_lag10 0.008 (1.49) -0.030 (-0.49) 
Return_lag11 -0.017 (-3.41) 0.085 (0.73) 
Return_lag12 -0.007 (-2.05) -0.042 (-0.69) 
R-squared 0.114 0.270 
N 38,246 140 





Relation between Fund Flows and Other Fund Characteristics 
This table reports descriptive fund characteristics conditional on actual fund flows.  Both fund flows and 
fund returns are measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA.  Fund-month observations 
with available flow data are sorted into deciles according to fund flow.  Expected flows are estimated via 
Fama-MacBeth regressions of fund flows on lagged flows and returns.  Cash holding is measured as a 
percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA.  Number of countries invested is the total number of 
countries, including both developed and emerging countries, in which the fund has non-zero allocation.  
For each fund-month, average market capitalization (volume) quintile is the average quintile of latest 
year-end market capitalization (volume), with 1 being the largest and 5 being the smallest, across all the 
countries held by the fund at the end of the month.  Averages of all fund-months in each decile are 
reported.  Test statistics are for the difference in mean between deciles 1 and 10, based on standard errors 
clustered by calendar year-month. 



















1 (Inflow) 13.55 0.94 3.43 4.34 7.55 2.41 2.42 
2 3.35 0.05 1.93 3.73 9.17 2.34 2.36 
3 1.13 -0.41 0.98 3.76 10.46 2.35 2.35 
4 0.16 -0.82 0.82 3.70 8.72 2.42 2.40 
5 -0.05 -0.89 0.80 3.22 7.47 2.51 2.51 
6 -0.54 -1.27 0.31 3.31 10.29 2.31 2.30 
7 -1.29 -1.35 0.17 3.05 10.20 2.28 2.28 
8 -2.39 -1.56 0.14 3.04 9.06 2.33 2.32 
9 -4.41 -1.62 0.27 2.59 8.22 2.36 2.35 
10 (Outflow) -12.61 -1.68 0.13 2.86 7.37 2.44 2.41 
1-10 26.16 2.62 3.30 1.48 0.18 -0.03 0.01 





Fund Trading Associated with Fund Flows 
This table reports how fund holdings change conditional on actual and expected flows, measured as a 
percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA.  Fund-month observations with available flow data are sorted 
into deciles according to fund flow (Panel A) and predicted fund flow (Panel B), estimated as in Table III.  
For each fund-month, countries are considered expanded (reduced) if the end-of-month holdings are 
greater (smaller) than the beginning-of-month holdings multiplied by the country index returns.  These 
are then reported as fractions of the total number of countries invested in at the beginning of the month.  
Average change in positions is computed as the cross-country average of the change in dollars invested as 
a percentage of beginning-of-month TNA.  Change in cash holding is also measured as a percentage of the 
beginning-of-month TNA. Test statistics are for the difference in mean between all fund-months in deciles 
1 and 10, based on standard errors clustered by calendar year-month. 
 
Panel A: Actual flow sort 







Avg. Change in 
Positions  
Change in 
Cash Holding  
1 (Inflows) 13.55 78.58 19.91 1.50 0.20 1.63 
2 3.35 62.77 35.72 1.50 0.04 0.47 
3 1.13 53.95 44.75 1.30 0.01 0.28 
4 0.16 47.86 50.97 1.17 -0.01 0.18 
5 -0.05 47.47 51.42 1.11 -0.01 0.22 
6 -0.54 45.43 52.90 1.67 -0.01 -0.08 
7 -1.29 42.38 55.71 1.91 -0.02 -0.23 
8 -2.39 37.89 60.29 1.83 -0.03 -0.22 
9 -4.41 32.50 65.55 1.95 -0.05 -0.59 
10 (Outflows) -12.61 21.58 75.10 3.31 -0.17 -1.35 
1-10 26.16 57.00 -55.19 -1.81 0.38 2.98 
t-statistic -- (40.36) (-39.63) (-5.17) (30.19) (13.47) 
 
Panel B: Expected flow sort 










Cash Holding  
1 (Inflows) 4.64 59.09 39.45 1.46 0.07 -0.13 
2 1.57 53.17 45.26 1.57 0.02 0.04 
3 0.53 50.08 48.61 1.31 0.01 -0.11 
4 -0.07 48.44 50.14 1.42 0.00 0.00 
5 -0.55 46.00 52.57 1.43 -0.01 0.06
6 -1.05 45.29 52.97 1.74 -0.01 0.06 
7 -1.62 44.38 53.85 1.77 -0.02 0.15 
8 -2.33 43.23 54.90 1.87 -0.02 -0.06 
9 -3.38 41.65 56.07 2.28 -0.04 0.24 
10 (Outflows) -6.35 39.27 58.32 2.40 -0.04 0.05 
1-10 10.99 19.82 -18.87 -0.94 0.11 -0.18 
t-statistic -- (11.66) (-11.35) (-4.10) (9.79) (-0.91) 
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Table VI  
Trading Costs and Fund Flows 
This table reports the average trading costs of countries expanded and countries reduced or eliminated conditional on actual fund 
flows.  Fund flows are measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month TNA.  Fund-month observations with available flow data 
are sorted into deciles according to fund flow.  For each fund-month, countries are divided into two groups—those that are expanded 
and those that are reduced or eliminated.  Countries are considered expanded (reduced) if the end-of-month holdings are greater 
(smaller) than the beginning-of-month holdings multiplied by the country index returns. Trading costs in basis points are first 
averaged for each group of countries for each fund in each month. In Panel A, the weight for each country is determined by the 
estimated amount bought and sold. In Panel B, all countries carry equal weight. The average trading costs are then averaged across 
fund-months in each flow decile. Test statistics are for the difference in mean between deciles 1 and 10 and between the groups of 
countries expanded and reduced or eliminated, and are calculated using standard errors clustered by calendar year-month. 
 
Panel A:  Value-weighted average 
Countries Expanded 
Countries Reduced or 




































1 (Inflows) 13.55 56.16 39.87 16.30 61.32 43.41 17.91 -5.16 -3.55 -1.61 (-7.41) (-8.98) (-3.21) 
2 3.35 55.36 39.39 15.97 57.67 41.14 16.52 -2.30 -1.75 -0.56 (-5.50) (-6.78) (-2.03) 
3 1.13 55.90 39.67 16.23 56.85 40.42 16.43 -0.95 -0.75 -0.20 (-2.36) (-2.43) (-0.77) 
4 0.16 57.63 40.11 17.52 58.39 40.94 17.44 -0.75 -0.83 0.08 (-1.47) (-2.56) (0.22) 
5 -0.05 58.21 40.61 17.59 58.21 40.68 17.53 0.00 -0.06 0.06 (0.00) (-0.20) (0.18) 
6 -0.54 56.36 39.64 16.72 55.82 39.86 15.96 0.54 -0.22 0.76 (1.30) (-0.76) (2.57) 
7 -1.29 56.72 40.08 16.64 55.28 39.29 15.99 1.45 0.79 0.66 (3.59) (2.98) (2.46) 
8 -2.39 58.36 40.84 17.51 55.73 39.40 16.32 2.63 1.44 1.19 (4.47) (4.02) (3.45) 
9 -4.41 58.66 41.49 17.18 56.22 39.69 16.53 2.45 1.80 0.65 (4.69) (5.36) (1.90) 
10 (Outflows) -12.61 61.33 42.89 18.44 55.78 39.60 16.18 5.55 3.29 2.26 (7.49) (6.75) (5.25) 
1-10 26.16 -5.17 -3.02 -2.14 5.54 3.81 1.73 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
t-statistic -- (-4.56) (-4.20) (-3.90) (5.65) (5.52) (3.57) 
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Table VI -continued 
 
Panel B:  Equally weighted average 
  Countries Expanded 
Countries Reduced or 




































1 (Inflows) 13.55 58.86 41.79 17.07 62.40 44.36 18.05 -3.55 -2.57 -0.98 (-5.31) (-6.47) (-2.12) 
2 3.35 57.35 41.01 16.33 59.88 42.81 17.07 -2.53 -1.79 -0.74 (-6.28) (-7.01) (-2.68) 
3 1.13 57.98 41.38 16.60 59.18 42.16 17.02 -1.19 -0.78 -0.41 (-3.09) (-2.86) (-1.66) 
4 0.16 59.55 41.59 17.96 60.50 42.47 18.03 -0.94 -0.87 -0.07 (-1.95) (-2.83) (-0.21) 
5 -0.05 59.91 41.89 18.02 60.48 42.09 18.39 -0.57 -0.20 -0.37 (-1.11) (-0.64) (-0.99) 
6 -0.54 58.43 41.24 17.19 58.35 41.63 16.72 0.08 -0.40 0.47 (0.20) (-1.76) (1.70) 
7 -1.29 58.78 41.64 17.14 57.98 41.18 16.81 0.80 0.47 0.33 (2.06) (1.76) (1.29) 
8 -2.39 60.49 42.38 18.11 58.77 41.33 17.44 1.72 1.05 0.66 (3.26) (3.21) (2.10) 
9 -4.41 60.46 42.93 17.53 59.00 41.55 17.45 1.47 1.38 0.09 (2.92) (4.31) (0.27) 
10 (Outflows) -12.61 62.54 43.92 18.61  58.65 41.62 17.02   3.89 2.30 1.59  (6.28) (5.05) (4.27) 
1-10 26.16 -3.68 -2.14 -1.54 3.76 2.73 1.03 -- -- -- -- -- -- 







Introducing the At-Risk Measure  
Panel A of this table shows At-Risk measured as a percentage of country market capitalization, and 
connects it with alternative measures of financial pressure.  Country-month observations (emerging 
countries only) with available data are sorted into quintiles according to At-Risk measured as a 
percentage of country market capitalization.  Market capitalizations are the latest year-end numbers.  
Average monthly volumes are from the previous calendar year.  Pressure 2 is calculated based on 
Equation (5) of Coval and Stafford (2007), henceforth C-S.  Since the actual change in fund holding in 
each country is not observed, it is estimated (for each fund-country-month) as the change in dollar 
holding net of the country index return in the month.  Averages of all country-months in each quintile are 
reported.  Test statistics are for the difference in mean between quintiles 1 and 5, based on standard errors 
clustered by calendar year-month.  Panel B of this table reports the average probabilities of a country 
currently in a particular At-Risk quintile moving to different At-Risk quintiles next month. The sample 
period is from February 1996 to October 2008. Each month, countries are sorted into quintiles based on 
At-Risk as a percentage of country market capitalization. The average probability of moving from quintile 
i to quintile j is calculated as the total number of times any country moves from quintile i in month t to 
quintile j at month t+1 divided by the total number of times any country is in quintile i. By definition, the 
sum of all probabilities across columns in the same row must be one. 
 














as % of Market 
Capitalization C-S Pressure2 
C-S Pressure2 
but with Market 
Capitalization 
in Denominator 
1 (Positive) 0.219 8.055 4.814 0.838 0.024 
2 0.049 2.451 2.733 0.309 0.007 
3 0.008 0.586 1.380 0.111 0.002 
4 -0.012 -0.758 1.624 -0.016 0.000 
5 (Negative) -0.109 -3.375 3.879 -0.206 -0.006 
1-5 0.328 11.430 0.935 1.044 0.030 
t-statistic -- (24.39) (5.32) (10.98) (15.17) 
 
Panel B: At-Risk quintile transition matrix 
From At-Risk To At-Risk Quintile 
Quintile 1 (Inflow) 2 3 4 5 (Outflow) 
1 (Inflow) 0.70 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.03 
2 0.20 0.48 0.24 0.06 0.03 
3 0.05 0.24 0.44 0.22 0.05 
4 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.50 0.19 
5 (Outflow) 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.67 





Return and Risk Characteristics of Calendar-Time Portfolios Based on At-Risk Sorted Portfolios 
This table reports average monthly returns and standard deviations of calendar-time portfolios.  The 
sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  Each month, equally-weighted portfolios are 
formed by sorting countries into quintiles based on At-Risk as a percentage of country market 
capitalization Time-series averages and standard deviations are reported for the entire sample and 
separately for the periods of positive and negative excess returns on the MSCI World index (the MSCI G-
7 index) in Panel A (Panel B).  Tests of difference in mean return and standard deviation of return are 
between quintile portfolios 1 and 5.  Statistics for the test of difference in mean return are calculated 
based on Newey-West standard errors using three lags.  Statistics for the test of difference in the standard 
deviation (or variance) of return are calculated based on the Brown-Forsythe method. 
 




Average Return (%) Standard Deviation of Return (%) 
All 
World Excess 
Return > 0 
World Excess 
Return < 0  
All 
World Excess 
Return > 0 
World Excess 
Return < 0 
1 (Positive) 1.91 5.26 -2.97 7.37 5.40 7.15 
2 1.38 4.45 -3.11 6.91 5.99 5.60 
3 0.54 3.62 -3.96 6.62 5.04 6.06 
4 0.63 3.78 -3.97 7.20 4.75 7.71 
5 (Negative) 0.63 3.93 -4.19 7.16 5.13 7.00 
1-5 1.28 1.33 1.22 0.21 0.27 0.15 
t-statistic (2.58) (2.37) (1.61) 
F-statistic (0.19) (0.09) (0.63) 
 




Average Return (%) Standard Deviation of Return (%) 
All 
G-7 Excess 
Return > 0 
G-7 Excess 
Return < 0  
All 
G-7 Excess 
Return > 0 
G-7 Excess 
Return < 0 
1 (Positive) 1.91 5.35 -2.83 7.37 5.40 7.11 
2 1.38 4.53 -2.98 6.91 6.01 5.59 
3 0.54 3.76 -3.92 6.62 5.01 5.97 
4 0.63 3.82 -3.78 7.20 4.78 7.68 
5 (Negative) 0.63 4.04 -4.09 7.16 5.07 6.97 
1-5 1.28 1.30 1.26 0.21 0.33 0.14 
t-statistic (2.58) (2.37) (1.62) 






At-Risk Sorted Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions 
This table reports results from time-series regressions of calendar-time long Q1 short Q5 portfolio returns 
on the world risk premium, over the sample period from February 1996 to October 2008. Countries are 
sorted into quintiles on the basis of actual At-Risk (first two columns) and predicted At-Risk (last two 
columns).  Predicted At-Risk is calculated by replacing the current month flow by the expected flows, 
estimated via the Fama-MacBeth regressions in Table III.  In Panel A (B), the excess return on the MSCI 
world index (the MSCI G-7 index) is on the RHS.  Positive (negative) world dummy equals one if the 
world excess return is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  The number of monthly observations is 
denoted by N, and Newey-West standard errors using three lags are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: MSCI World Index as the market portfolio 





Intercept 0.013** -0.001 -0.001 -0.017* 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) 
World Excess Return 0.002 -0.039 
(0.089) (0.159) 
Positive World Dummy * World Excess Return 0.509*** 0.540** 
(0.190) (0.267) 
Negative World Dummy * World Excess Return -0.319** -0.401* 
(0.143) (0.233) 
N 150 150 139 139 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 
          
 
Panel B: MSCI G-7 Index as the market portfolio 





Intercept 0.013** -0.001 -0.001 -0.017* 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) 
G-7 Excess Return 0.005 -0.038 
(0.091) (0.160) 
Positive G-7 Dummy * G-7 Excess Return 0.510*** 0.542** 
(0.191) (0.261) 
Negative G-7 Dummy * G-7 Excess Return -0.324** -0.400* 
(0.140) (0.241) 
N 150 150 139 139 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 




Holding Sorted Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions 
This table reports results from time-series regressions of calendar-time long Q1 short Q5 portfolio returns 
on the world risk premium, over the sample period from February 1996 to October 2008. Countries are 
sorted into quintiles on the basis of beginning-of-month holding in the country of all sample funds, 
measured as a percentage of the country market capitalization. In Panel A (B), the excess return on the 
MSCI world index (the MSCI G-7 index) is on the RHS.  Positive (negative) world dummy equals one if 
the world excess return is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  The number of monthly observations is 
denoted by N, and Newey-West standard errors using three lags are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: MSCI World Index as the market portfolio 
  Holding Sort Holding Sort 
Intercept -0.002 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.008) 
World Excess Return 0.893*** 
(0.134) 
Positive World Dummy * World Excess Return 0.978*** 
(0.256) 
Negative World Dummy * World Excess Return 0.839*** 
(0.194) 
N 150 150 
R-squared 0.35 0.35 
      
 
Panel B: MSCI G-7 Index as the market portfolio 
  Holding Sort Holding Sort 
Intercept -0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.007) 
G-7 Excess Return 0.886*** 
(0.129) 
Positive G-7 Dummy * G-7 Excess Return 0.893*** 
(0.241) 
Negative G-7 Dummy * G-7 Excess Return 0.881*** 
(0.195) 
N 150 150 
R-squared 0.33 0.33 





Liquidity Adjusted At-Risk Sorted Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions 
This table reports results from time-series regressions of calendar-time long Q1 short Q5 portfolio returns 
on the world risk premium, over the sample period from February 1996 to October 2008. Countries are 
sorted into quintiles on the basis of actual liquidity-adjusted At-Risk (first two columns) and predicted 
liquidity-adjusted At-Risk (last two columns). For each country-month, liquidity-adjusted At-Risk is 
calculated as the product of At-Risk and the corresponding price impact costs. For country-months with 
missing price impact costs, the time-series average price impact costs for the country are used.  Predicted 
At-Risk is calculated by replacing the current month flow by the expected flows, estimated via the Fama-
MacBeth regressions in Table III.  The world excess return is the excess return on the MSCI world index.  
Positive (negative) world dummy equals one if the world excess return is positive (negative) and zero 
otherwise.  The number of monthly observations is denoted by N, and Newey-West standard errors using 













Intercept 0.017*** 0.003 0.006 -0.014 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
World Risk Premium -0.094 0.001 
(0.110) (0.146) 
Positive World Dummy * World Risk Premium 0.418* 0.686** 
(0.236) (0.324) 
Negative World Dummy * World Risk Premium -0.419*** -0.428*** 
(0.147) (0.142) 
N 150 150 139 139 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 









Figure 1. Comparison between EPFR and CRSP mutual fund data.  For a subset of funds, this figure 
compares the average TNAs and the average monthly returns from the EPFR and CRSP mutual fund data.  
The two data sets are matched by fund name.  The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  
Panel A plots the (time-series) average TNAs.  The TNA for each fund-month is measured as the sum of 
reported TNAs of all share classes from the same portfolio.  Panel B plots the (time-series) average 
monthly returns.  The return for each fund-month is measured as the sum of US$ return of all share 









Figure 2. Comparison between EPFR and TIC data.  This figure compares the cumulative standardized change in dollar holding of all funds in 
the EPFR data with the cumulative standardized net transactions in foreign stocks (by U.S. investors) from the TIC data for four countries: Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, and Russia.  The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  The change in dollar holding and the net 
transactions in stocks for each country are standardized by subtracting their own means and dividing by their own standard deviations.  The red 



































































































































































































































Figure 3. Relation between fund flows and changes in positions.  This figure plots the average net 
percentage changes in positions for funds in different deciles of actual and expected flows (Panel A) and 
actual and cash-adjusted flows (Panel B).  Flows are measured as a percentage of the beginning-of-month 
TNA. Expected flow is estimated via Fama-MacBeth regressions of flows on lagged flows and returns, 
where coefficients are the time-series average of periodic cross-sectional regression coefficients.  Cash-
adjusted flows are calculated as the sum of flows and cash holdings at the beginning of the month. For 
each fund-month, the net percentage change in positions is calculated as the percentage of countries in 
which the fund increases its holding during the month minus the percentage of countries in which the 
fund reduces or eliminates its holding. Each country holding is considered increased (reduced) if the end-
of-month dollar holding is the country is greater (less) than the beginning-of-month dollar holding 
multiplied by the country index return. All fund-months observations are sorted into deciles according to 
the fund’s actual and expected flows for the month.  The average of net percentage change in positions is 






Figure 4. Cumulative logged returns.  This figure plots the cumulative logged returns of the calendar-
time long Q1/short Q5 portfolio (blue solid line) and the cumulative excess return on the MSCI world 
index (red dashed line). The sample period is from February 1996 to October 2008.  Each month, 
countries are sorted into quintiles on the basis of At-Risk as a percentage of the country market 
capitalization.  The portfolio is then constructed by going long the equally-weighted portfolio of countries 
in the top At-Risk quintile and going short the equally-weighted portfolio of countries in the bottom At-




Figure 5. Aggregate flows and G-7 returns.  This figure plots aggregated dollar flows to the funds in 
the EPFR sample (blue solid line) and the 3-month moving average excess returns on the MSCI G-7 

















































































































Aggregate Flow (% of TNA)




Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns During “Crisis Regime” 
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns During “Normal Regime” 
 
 
Figure 6. Conditional cumulative abnormal returns. This figure plots the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for countries in the highest (Q1) and lowest (Q5) At-Risk quintiles, conditional on the 
contemporaneous MSCI G-7 returns. Countries are sorted into quintiles on the basis of At-Risk.  Month 0 
is the month in which the countries are placed in Q1 and Q5. For each event, CARs are measured as 
average monthly returns of all countries in the quintile in excess of the equally weighted average return of 
all emerging countries in the sample. CARs are then averaged across events. Panel A (Panel B) presents 
the CARs for countries in Q1 and Q5 during months in which the MSCI G-7 returns are less than or equal 
to (greater than) the 10th percentile during the sample period. 
 
